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SUMMARY
The aim of this dissertation, presented in chapter 1, is threefold:
(l) to give an overview of the most important developments of choice theories
in which structuring of the choice situation takes a special place: the
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1919, 1984) and the discrimination
model (Lindenberg, 1980, 1981, 1986, 1989a);
(2) to determine the empirical validity of the prospect theory and the discrimina-
tion model as fiaming theories;
(3) to compare the prospect heory with the discrimination model empirically on
strategic elements in order to ascertain the possible advantages of the one to
the other.
The growing interest in choice theories with special attention for the structuring
of choice situations is based on cumulative evidence that there is more to choice
than weighing the options, especially when a situation is not well structured. It
seems necessary to develop an integrated choice theory of structuring and
evaluation in order to explain behaviour.
Recently, two kinds of such integrated choice theories have been developed.
They stem from two different theoretical Íaditions. The prospect theory is
situated within the field of cognitive and social (or to be more precise, decision)
psychology. The other theory, the discrimination model is developed within the
field of rational choice sociology. Both theories can be seen as the most com-
plete choice theory within their own Íields, in which both evaluation and
structuring play an important role.
In chapter 2, the prospect theory is presented. The theory distinguishes two
different phases in the choice process: the editing phase and the evaluation
phase. Editing or structuring has three different meanings in the prospect theory:
(1) polishing the options by combining, segregating, canceling or simplifying
(elements o0 the options; (2) processing the reference point; (3) selecting a
mental account.
Important components of the evaluation phase are the following assump-
t45
146 Framing: de prospecttheorie n het discriminatiemodel
tions: (a) outcomes are classified with regard to a reference point in terms of
gains or losses; (b) the utility curve is S-shaped; (c) the utility curve is asym-
metrical for gains and losses. With regard to subjective probabilities it is
assumed that stated low probabilities will be overvalued and stated moderate or
high probabilities will be undervalued. This is expressed in a so-called function
of decision weights.
In chapter 3, the empirical merits of the different elements from the prospect
theory are assessed by means of a literature survey. For the elements of the
editing phase it can be concluded that the empirical tests support both the
assumptions of polishing and of reference point effects. However, due to the fact
that the theory is not well developed with regard to mental accounts, there is
little to be said about its empirical validity on this point. All in all, it seems that
the prospect theory is a theory about various situational influences rather than a
theory which explains the creation and working of frames which stÍucture the
choice situation.
Regarding the elements of the evaluation phase, it can be concluded that the
assumed shape of the utility curve is fairly well supported by empirical tests.
What is needed is a further elaboration of the conditions under which the S-
shape and the asymmetry might (not) occur. There is a dearth of empirical
evidence concerning people's classification of decision outcomes in terms of
gains or losses and the assumption about the probabilities.
ln chapÍer 4, the discrimination model is presented. In this theory the
structuring of choice situations takes a central place. A decision maker structures
choice situations on the basis of one of the potential goals that he could pursue
in the given situation. By linking the discrimination model to the theory of
social production functions (instrumenlal goal chains), Lindenberg is able to
provide a heuristic for finding the potential situational goals. One of the situa-
tional goals is the most salient one. It is the one that discriminates best between
the options. It is therefore called the frame by means of which the decision
maker structures the choice situation. The preference order of the options is
itself based on the frame, or rather on the goal criterium. This criterium is the
operationalization of the salient goal in a particulaÍ situation. The stronger the
discrimination between the options, the stronger the situation is structured by the
salient goal and the more likely that the most preferred option will be chosen.
The other situational goals recede to the background but still exert an
influence on the choice behaviour via their influence on the saliency of the
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Summary
and they diminish the saliency if they are not. The saliency of the frame
determines the choice probability for each option. When the relevant parameters
can be estimated, the prediction can be cardinal, but often only ordinal predic-
tions are possible.
A change in the choice situation can lead to a frame-switch. This occurs if
things change such that another goal structures the situation better than the
previous frame. This other goal then becomes the frame. A frame-switch usually
means that the preference order of the options changes too.
For the evaluation of the options, the discrimination model uses the assump-
tions from subjective expected utility (SEU) theory with the proviso that only
the options within a frame are evaluated.
ln chapter 5, the research questions are lined up. The first question concerns
the predictive validity of the discrimination model. While the discrimination
model has previously been tested as a decision model, it had so far never been
tested with regard to its framing assumptions. The other two questions concern
the compzuison of the prospect heory with the discrimination model. Since the
prospect theory -in contrast o the discrimination model- is strictly speaking no
framing theory, there can be no so-called critical test. However, an alternative
form of confronlation is possible. The nature of the discrimination model
enables us to use assumptions from other theories, in this case from the prospect
theory, as auxiliary assumptions. The crucial test therefore was whether an
assumption provides more accurate predictions as a constituent of the prospect
theory or of the discrimination model.
In the scope of this book two assumptions have been considered for such a
test: one on the working of the reference point and the other on loss aversion.
The second research question can be described as follows: does consideration of
the reference point effects lead to more accurate predictions in the prospect
theory or in the discrimination model? The loss aversion in the prospect theory
is expressed by the asymmetrical util ity curve. Here, the role of loss aversion is
located in the evaluation phase. Loss aversion is expressed by the loss hypothe-
sis in the discrimination model. Here, the role of loss aversion is located in the
structuring phase. The third research question can therefore be described as
follows: does consideration of loss aversion lead to more accurate predictions if
it is processed in the evaluation phase (the prospect heory) or in the structuring
phase (the discrimination model)?
In chaprer 6, the Íirst research question, concerning the predictive validity of
the discrimination model, is answered. An experiment on the use of a frame and
t41
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the effect of a frame-switch was conducted. The experimental situation con-
tained two possible frames, based on the exchange value and on the consump-
tion value of a book. In the former, the frame is "making profit" and in the
latter, the frame is "making use of'. It was predicted that if the book was bought
given a profit frame then the opportunity to sell it will be strmctured according
to how appropriate the options ("selling" or "not selling") are to a profit frame.
Given at least a reasonable offer, the preferred option will be to sell. If the book
was bought within a "making use of' frame then the opportunity to sell it will
be structured according to how appropriate the options are for the fiame
"making use of'. In this case, the most preferred option is "not selling". How-
ever, the higher the offer, the lower the saliency of the frame "making use of'.
Thus, a high offer is likely to cause a frame-switch from "making use of' to
"making profit". The discrimination model also predicts that changes in the offer
have a direct and therefore strong effect in the profit frame, whereas they have
only an indirect and therefore weak effect given a use frame. It can be conclu-
ded that the discrimination model has predictive validity, because the hypotheses
were supported by the experimenial results.
In chapter '1, the second research question. concerning the role of the
reference point in the prospect theory versus the discrimination model, is
answered. In an experiment on the purchase of a consumer good, the reference
point was introduced in a (average) price listed in a consumer report on this
good. A person could buy this good in store A (where he is now) or in another
store of the same chain ten minutes walk further down the road. By manipu-
lating the price differences in the two stores and their relation to the reference
point, speciÍic predictions were made on the basis of both theories. It turns out
that the predictions of the discrimination model receive more support from the
data than the predictions of the prospect theory. The reference point clearly has
an effect but not the one predicted by the prospect heory.
The third research question is dealt with in chapter 8. It is empirically tested
whether the assumption on loss aversion leads to better results when located in
the structuring or in the evaluation phase. An experiment analogous to Thaler's
sunk cost example (1980) was conducted. A person could decide either or not to
go to a concert. In any case she had to bike 30 minutes, but in one condition the
weather was good and in another it rained cats and dogs. Would she go? The
interesting extra condition was the price of the ticket: 0, 10 guilders or 40
guilders. On the basis of the prospect theory (the asymmetric utility function),
the difference between 0 and 10 suilders is much smaller than the difference
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between l0 and 40 guilders. Thus, the choice probability (frequency) differences
of going to the concert should be much larger between the l0 and 40 guilders
conditions than between the 0 and l0 guilders conditions. The prediction on the
basis of the discrimination model was that once the loss was big enough to
cause a loss avoidance frame, merginal loss would decrease rapidly' Thus, the
biggest difference in choice probability (frequency) is between 0 and l0
guilders, and only a small difference will be observed between l0 and 40
guilders conditions. These differences in prediction clearly reflect the differences
between the two theories. The prospect theory is a theory with framing effects
like reference points and asymmetry of the utility function. These effects work
via the evaluation phase. The discrimination model is a framing theory where
the effects of framing occur in the structuring phase. The results of this experi-
ment clearly favor the location of framing effects in the structuring phase and
thus corroborate the discrimination model.
In chapter 9 a summary of the empirical studies is given. Furthermore, some
recent developments in the area of decision psychology about structuring a
choice situation are discussed. It is also suggested that the discrimination model
should be compared to a descriptive elaboration of the multi-attribute utility
(MAU) theory. Although the MAU-theory is not a framing theory, there are
many potential resemblances to the discrimination model. At the end an un-
solved problem of the discrimination model is discussed. Considering the
importance of loss aversion for this model, it needs more detailed assumptions
about different kinds of loss management. A number of suggestions in this
direction are made. In general, this chapter shows in various respects how one
could proceed with research on choice theories in which structuring the choice
situation has a central Position.
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